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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
COMMENTS
REGULATION OF BUSINESS -

SHERMAN AcT -

ADMINISTRATION

AND ENFORCEMENT-A RE-ANALYSIS OF CONSENT DECREES -

No

problem in the field of antitrust administration and enforcement
has attracted so much attention or generated so much comment
recently as has the increased use of consent decrees in civil prosecutions1 brought by the Department of Justice2 under the Sherman
Act.3 The consent decree may be approached from many different
angles. No study of this weapon of antitrust administration has
touched upon all aspects of the problem.4 This comment will deal
with a review of the history, nature, and use of the consent decree,
an analysis of some of the more recent and important decrees, and
a discussion of the crucial problem, raised especially by the Report
of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws,5 of the constitutional and statutory bases (or lack
thereof) for the relief granted by consent decrees.

I.

History, Nature and Use of Consent Decrees

In 1906 the first consent decree in a civil suit filed under the
Sherman Act was entered in the case of United States v. Otis Ele1 A consent decree is entered only in a civil suit brought in a federal district court
under §4 of the Sherman Act. 26 Stat. L. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §4. Criminal
prosecutions. under the Sherman Act are never ended by consent judgment but may be,
and often are, either nolprossed by the government or ended by a plea of nolo contendere
on the part of the defendants, either one of which may be considered the practical equivalent to a consent decree. See, generally, Duncan, "The 'Big Case'-When Tried Criminally," 4 WEST. REs. L. REv. 99 at 108 (1953); Peterson, "Consent Decrees: A Weapon of
Antitrust Enforcement," 18 UNIV. KAN. CITY L. REV. 34 at 35, n. 3 (1950).
2 This comment is confined to the use of consent decrees by the Department of Justice.
On the consent ·settlement procedure utilized by the Federal Trade Commission, see
Sheehy, "Consent Settlements of Federal Trade Commission Complaints," FEDERAL ANTI·
TRUST LAws 285 (1953) (University of Michigan Summer Institute).
8 Commonly, consent settlements are negotiated as to complaints brought under §§1
and/or 2 of the Sherman Act. But many consent decrees are entered in cases involving
the Clayton Act. For a recent and important case arising under §7 of that act [38 Stat.
L. 731 (1914), as amended by 64 Stat. L. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §18], see United
States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., . (D.C. Ill. 1956) 1956 CCH Trade Gas. ,r68,253. See also
United States v. General Shoe Corp., (D.C. Tenn. 1956) 1956 CCH Trade Cas. ,r68,271.
4 The major studies to date in this area are, chronologically, Donovan and McAllister,
"Consent Decrees in the Enforcement of Federal Antitrust Laws," 46 HARV. L. REv. 885
(1933); Hamilton and Till, "Antitrust in Action," T.N.E.C. Monograph No. 16, pp. 8897 (1940); Isenbergh and Rubin, "Antitrust Enforcement Through Consent Decrees," 53
HAR.v. L. REv. 386 (1940); Katz, "The Consent Decree in Antitrust Administration," 53
HARv. L. REv. 415 (1940); Timberg, "Recent Developments in Antitrust Consent Judg-ments," IO FED. B.J. 351 (1949); Peterson, "Consent Decrees: A Weapon of Antitrust
Enforcement," 18 UNIV. KAN. CITY L. REV. 34 (1950).
5 REPORT OF TiiE ATIORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY TiiE ANTITRUST

LAws 361 (1955), hereinafter cited as R.EPoRT.
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vator Co.,6 in which the defendants, while denying any violation
of the act and stating that they had no desire or intention to violate
it, nevertheless consented to the entry of a decree against them.
Since 1906, this procedure has become commonplace. For example, 72 percent of all civil actions filed by the Department of J ustice in the years 1935 to I 955 were settled by consent decrees,7 and,
while most of these settlements are in "minor" cases,8 this suggests
that administration and enforcement of the antitrust laws is now
accomplished very largely by negotiation. Because a consent decree
is commonly worked out by negotiation and is given little or no
examination or scrutiny before being signed by the judge,9 it is
regrettable but true that the lack of knowledge of the facts or
issues involved in consent decree cases has led to the process often
being viewed as either a potential whitewash for the defendants or
as a device by which the government squeezes all it can get from
the defendants irrespective of the constitutional or statutory basis
for the relief sought. Further, the necessary secrecy of the process
has subjected it to political attack.10
Why the increased use of and emphasis on consent decrees?
This question is, unlike most others on this subject, fairly easy to
answer. From the point of view of the defendant, the consent decree procedure offers: (1) less expense, (2) less publicity,11 (3) the
knowledge that the decree cannot be used as a basis for a future
treble damage suit under section 4 of the Clayton Act,12 and, of
course, (4) less disruption of normal business affairs than would
6

(9th Cir. 1906) Decrees and Judgments in Federal Antitrust Cases 107.

7 REPORT

360.

For other, and even higher, figures, see 63 HARv. L. REv. 320 (1949); Barnes, "Settlement by Consent Judgment," ABA Antitrust Section Proceedings 8 (April 1954).
SSee Hamilton and Till, "Antitrust in Action," T.N.E.C. Monograph No. 16, p. 89
(1940).
9 See the instances cited by Isenberg and Rubin, "Antitrust Enforcement Through
Consent Decrees,'' 53 HARV. L. REv. 386 at 408-409 (1940) and Peterson, "Consent Decrees:
A Weapon of Anti-Trust Enforcement,'' 18 UNIV. KAN. CITY L. REv. 34 at 41 (1950),
pointing out the repeated and constant lack of supervision and control by district judges
over the terms of consent decrees. See also 63 HARv. L. REv. 320 at 322, n. 13 (1949).
10 E.g., it has been suggested that a conservative administration can use consent
decrees to show "paper accomplishment in the enforcement" of the antitrust laws. See
Hamilton and Till, "Antitrust in Action,'' T.N.E.C. Monograph No. 16, p. 90 (1940).
Professor Louis Schwartz, dissenting from the Report, suggested that the secrecy problem
might be solved by requiring that the Department of Justice publish a memorandum
stating the back.ground of and the reasons for entering into a consent decree. Schwartz
dissent, I ANTITRUsr BuL. 37 at 54 (1955), and see WALL ST. J., March 30, 1956, p. 5:1.
11 On this point especially, see the example given by Barnes, "Settlement by Consent
Judgment,'' ABA Antitrust Section Proceedings 8 at 11 (April 1954).
12 This is so by the express terms of §5 (a) of the Clayton Act. See Bamsdale Refining
Corp. v. Birnamwood Oil Co., (D.C. Wis. 1940) 32 F. Supp. 308 (nolo contendere); Baush
Machine Tool Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, (2d Cir. 1935) 79 F. (2d) 217. The terms
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take place if there were a long, involved trial. All four of these
factors are important to a defendant, the third perhaps the most
so.13 From the point of view of the government, the consent settlement procedure offers a means to accomplish results it deems desirable in a given industry without the time and expense necessary
to secure a litigated decree. Further, it would seem that the Department of Justice has not overlooked the fact that it can secure
by consent specific measures of relief that it might be difficult to
convince a court to grant in a litigated case.14 Lastly, the government is freed from the uncertainty of the result that inheres in a
litigated case and also from the requirement of producing and
proving the factual bases for its complaint and is, generally, subject to much less formal control in the prosecution of its suit.11s
The consent decree is, of course, a compromise between two
parties to a civil (equitable in nature) suit, the exact terms of
which are fixed by negotiation between the parties and formalized
by the signature -of the federal district judge. The whole procedure adds flexibility to antitrust prosecution, but it is not agreed
who enters the bargaining room in the better position. Several
of §5 (a) are specifically called into play by the recital in almost every consent decree in
recent years that it is entered without findings of fact or conclusions of law. But §5 (a)
may not apply where, in fact, part of the case has been litigated-typically where testi•
mony has been taken. Homewood Theatre, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., (D.C. Minn. 1952) 1952
CCH Trade Cas. iJ67,333; Don George, Inc:; v. Paral:Ilount Pictures, Inc., (D.C. La. 1951)
1952 CCH Trade Cas. iJ67,294. See also Ulrich v. Ethyl Gasoline Corp., (D.C. Ky. 1941)
CCH Trade Reg. Rep., 9th ed., iJ52,549; DeLuxe Theatre Corp. v. Balaban and Katz
Corp., (D.C. Ill. 1951) 95 F. Supp. 983.
13 It is interesting to note that the IBM consent decree (1956 CCH Trade Cas. iJ68,245)
followed by less than a month the filing of a treble damage suit against IBM by SperryRand Corporation, in the amount of $90,000,000. See N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1956, p. 1:5.
This suit was later withdrawn on Aug. 21, 1956, and at the same time IBM dropped a
counterclaim against Sperry-Rand for patent infringement, See N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1956,
p. 39:6.
Professor Schwartz advocates allowing the use of consent decrees as prima facie
evidence under §4 of the Clayton Act, i.e., doing away with the exception made by §5 (a).
What such a change would do to the whole consent decree procedure Professor Schwartz
does not state, nor, apparently care. But obviously a defendant will not be willing to subject
himself to the awesome treble damage recovery without first putting up a struggle in the
prior suit by the government. Ignoring the question of whether this would· emasculate
consent decree procedure entirely, Professor Schwartz contents himself with saying that
in agreeing to a consent decree, the government is "bargaining away all real possibility
of recovery by private victims." A colleague, Professor Stedman, merely observes that the
§5 (a) limitation on the use of consent decrees is a disadvantage, especially unfortunate
in view of the "fact," for which no authority is cited, that the most flagrant antitrust
violations are those that are settled by consent judgment. See Schwartz Dissent, 1 ANTITRUST BUL. 37 at 54 (1955); Stedman, "The Committee's Report: More Antitrust Enforcement-Or Less?" 50 N.W. UNIV. L. R.Ev. 316 at 323 (1955).
14 See the discussion of this point in Part III infra.
,
_ 15 This overall flexibility in the consent decree_procedure is basically the reason for its
rejuvenation by Thurman Arnold in 1938. See REP. AITY. GEN. 65-66 (1938).
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writers have suggested, with a great deal of justification, that once
a defendant has indicated a willingness to compromise, the government is in the superior position in fixing the precise terms of the
decree.16 On the other hand, it has been pointed out that the
government attorneys are in a far from invulnerable position because of their own comparative ignorance of the intricacies of the
industry with which they are dealing.17
The nature of the consent decree has also caused confusion and
uncertainty as to the basic aims which the government ought to
pursue in consent cases. Should it be simply a question of securing
specific relief against one "law violator"18 as a means of insuring
that no future action of a type previously carried on will occur, or
should the government have the responsibility (since, apparently,
it has the opportunity19 ) to seek relief in the nature of industrywide regulation on a broad economic scale?20 And, if the latter is
desirable in theory, is it legally justified in view of the fact that it
smacks of both the administrative-regulation type of control used
in other federally controlled areas but not authorized in the antitrust field and also of an NRA type of sweeping economic supervision?21 These questions are unanswered to date and perhaps are
unanswerable. But they do suggest that anomalies of consent settlement procedure spring from the ambiguous nature of the decree
itself. Is it a horse trade between two litigants formalized by a
judge's signature,22 or is it a decree of a federal district court enjoining certain business practices, differing from the normal decree
only in that it lacks specific findings of fact and declarations of illegality? If it is the former, it is arguable that the government is
justified in (1) asking for relief that would not otherwise be
granted in a litigated case and (2) seeking to move on an industry16 See Horsky, "Settlement,'' ABA Antitrust Section Proceedings 102 (August 1954);
Segal and Mullinix, "Administration and Enforcement," 104 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 285 at 297
(1955).
17 Hamilton and Till, "Antitrust in Action,'' T.N.E.C. Monograph No. 16, pp. 90-91
(1940).
18 Professor Schwartz' description of a defendant. See Schwartz Dissent, l ANTITRusr
BuL. 37 at 53-55 (1955).
19 But see Carman, "Analysis of Chapter VIII,'' ABA Antitrust Section Proceedings
148 at 156 (August 1955).
20 Hamilton and Till, "Antitrust in Action," T.N.E.C. Monograph No. 16, pp. 91-92
(1940).
21 See Katz, "The Consent Decree in Antitrust Administration," 53 HAR.v. L. REv. 415
(1940). Compare the FTC's Trade Practice Conference Rules.
22 See the brief discussion of this view by Peterson, "Consent Decrees: A Weapon of
Antitrust Enforcement," 18 UNIV. KAN. CITY L. R.Ev. 34 at 40 (1950).
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wide scale without prime attention to the allegedly harmful and
illegal business practices of the particular defendant. If not, if the
consent decree is thought of as another means of judicial enforcement of the antitrust laws, the converse may be true. 23
In Swift & Co. v. United States24 the Supreme Court gave its
blessing to the consent decree as a weapon of antitrust administration. It held in that case that a decree could be attacked, whether
by a motion to vacate, appeal, or bill of review, only on such
grounds as lack of actual consent to the decree, lack of federal jurisdiction, fraud in the procurement, clerical error, etc. As for other
grounds, such as the existence of a case or controversy, the factual
basis for the decree or the justification for the actual terms of it,
these points could not be urged by a consenting party in a later
attack. Later authority has more fully developed and strengthened
the consent decree. For instance, United States v. Institute of
Carpet Manufacturers of America25 reiterated that a consent decree
estops the consenting party from attacking its validity and, further,
that a decree is not open to attack for failure to state the facts and
reasons underlying the decree. In legal effect and force, then, a
consent decree is practically indistinguishable from a litigated decree.26 And in practical effect, it is not unlikely that it affords legal
precedent for future decrees, both litigated and consensual, especially as to the nature of the relief granted.27
Other problem areas which should be briefly mentioned before
proceeding to a discussion of some of the more important recent
consent decrees are (1) modification, (2) concurrent civil and
criminal suits, (3) the appropriate time (before or after the complaint) for the negotiations, and (4) the issue of who should initially draft and present the decree.
23 See, generally, Oppenheim, "Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised
National Antitrust Policy," 50 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1139 at 1228-1236 (1952).
24 276 U.S. 311, 48 S.Ct. 311 (1928). On the history of the packer's decree generally,
see Donovan and McAllister, "Consent Decrees in the Enforcement of Federal Antitrust
Laws," 46 HARV. L. R.Ev. 885 at 886-899 (1933); 42 YALE L.J. 81 (1932).
25 (D.C. N.Y. 1941) I F.R.D. 636. See also St. Louis Amusement Co. v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., (D.C. Mo. 1945) 61 F. Supp. 854, affd. (8th Cir. 1948) 168 F. (2d) 988.
26 See Isenbergh and Rubin, "Antitrust Enforcement Through Consent Decrees," 53
HARV. L. REv. 386 at 388 (1940). On the res judicata effect of consent decrees, see the
litigation involving the Aluminum Company of America discussed by Katz, "The Consent
Decree in Antitrust Administration," 53 HARV. L. R.Ev. 415 at 420-423 (1940).
27 It would seem likely that the royalty free licensing provisions of many consent
decrees (see note 76 infra) must have had some effect upon Judge Foreman when he
ordered dedication of the lamp and lamp parts patents in the litigated case of United
States v. General Electric Co., (D.C. N.J. 1953) 115 F. Supp. 835 at 843. Cf. Timberg,
"Equitable Relief Under the Sherman Act," 1950 UNIV. ILL. L. FORUM 629.
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Modification of Consent Decrees.28 The federal district court
which originally enters an antitrust consent decree retains the
power to modify that decree both expressly29 and by operation of
law.30 In United States v. Swift & Co.31 the defendant, taking a
new tack in its efforts to overthrow the packer's decree,32 had persuaded the district court to grant a modification of the decree on
a "change of circumstances" basis. The Supreme Court reversed,
however, declaring that much more than this was needed to secure
modification of a consent decree. Specifically, the Court stated that
the question was not one of changing circumstances but of irreparable injury: "Nothing less than a clear showing of grievous
wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions should lead us
to change what was decreed after years of litigation with the consent of all concerned." 33 The automobile finance decrees34 provided the Supreme Court with further grist for this particular mill.
Despite a suggestion of a liberalization in the requirements for
modification in Chr,,sler Corp. v. United States,35 in which the
government was the party seeking modification, the Court apparently returned to the strict "hardship" theory of the second Swift
case in Ford Motor Co. v. United States,36 also a case in which the
government was the petitioning party. In the latter case, although
the majority opinion did not even cite the second Swift case, it
appears to say that the party seeking modification must sustain a
heavy burden of proving the necessity of the change.37
Concurrent Civil and Criminal Suits. The Supreme Court has
given its approval to simultaneous civil and criminal suits in the
28 See, generally, 63 HARv. L. R.Ev. 320 (1949). Cf. also Hughes v. United States, 342
U.S. 353, 72 S.Ct. 306 (1952); Liquid Carbonic Corp. v. United States, 350 U.S. 869, 76 S.Ct.
114 (1955).
29 Most, if not all, antitrust consent decrees contain a specific paragraph asserting that
the court retains jurisdiction for the purpose of making any necessary modification.
80 United States v. Swift 8: Co., 286 U.S. 106 at 114, 52 S.Ct. 460 (1932).
31 Ibid. For the treatment of the modification of consent decrees prior to the second
Swift case, see 63 HARv. L. REv. 320 at 321, n. 10 (1949).
32 See note 24 supra.
33 286 U.S. 106 at 119, 52 S.Ct. 460 (1932).
34 United States v. Ford Motor Co., (D.C. Ind. 1938) CCH Trade Reg. Rep., 8th ed.,
,i25,171; United States v. Chrysler Corp., (D.C. Ind. 1938) CCH Trade Reg. Rep., 9th ed.,
1941-1943 Ct. Dec. Vol. ,i52.537. See, generally, Birnbaum, "The Auto Finance Consent
Decree: A New Technique in Enforcing the Sherman Act," 24 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 525
(1939); Haberman and Birnbaum, "The Auto-Finance Consent Decrees-An Epilogue,''
1950 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. R.Ev. 46.
35 316 U.S. 556, 62 S.Ct. 1146 (1942).
86 335 U.S. 303, 69 S.Ct. 93 (1948). See also United States v. Radio Corp. of America.
(D.C. Del. 1942) 46 F. Supp. 654.
37 See 63 HARV. L. REv. 320 at 328 (1949).
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enforcement of the antitrust laws,38 and this is significant in the
consent decree context. What happens to the concurrent criminal
suit on the signing of a consent decree? Can and does the Department of Justice use the concurrent criminal suit as an in terrorem
device? In 1939, Wendell Berge, then special assistant to Thurman
Arnold, formally elucidated on an earlier Department of Justice
release39 and stated that a good consent decree, i.e., one which confers "substantial public benefits," warranted the dismissal of the
concurrent criminal suit. On the other hand, Mr. Berge continued, "criminal proceedings should not and will not be used to
coerce the submission of consent decrees." 40 Noble as this last
sentiment is, it is belied both by the former one and by basic practicalities. The indictment hanging over the head of the corporation officer may not be intentional coercion, but it is surely duress
of circumstances, since he knows precisely on what conditions the
Department of Justice will dismiss it. 41 However, not only is it
evident that the department has not been unreasonable in the use
of its in terrorem powers,42 but it has also been pointed out (by
Mr. Berge himself) that the department is restricted in the consent
decree negotiations if there is a simultaneous criminal case.43
Time for Negotiations. In 1954 the then assistant attorney
general in charge of the Antitrust "Division announced that the
division was experimenting with negotiating for consent settlements prior to the filing of a complaint but, presumably, after
investigation had already commenced.44 The Attorney General's
National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws endorsed this
0

38 Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 at 52, 33 S.Ct. 9 (1912).
39 Release of May 18, 1938, set out in REP. ATIY. GEN. 306 (1938).
40 Berge, "Some Problems in the Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws," 38 MICH. L.
R.Ev. 462 at 474 (1940). Compare the interesting statement by the same author that
decrees which contain provisions for "affirmative public benefits" are the "only consent
decrees which the Department is willing to consider during the pendency of a criminal
case. . . ." Berge, "Remedies Available to the Government Under the Sherman Act,'' 7
LAw AND CONTEM. PROB. 104 at 109 (1940).
41 See Isenbergh and Rubin, "Antitrust Enforcement Through Consent Decrees," 53
HARv. L. R.Ev. 386 at 402 (1940).
·
42 Id. at 404.
43 Berge, "Remedies Available to the Government Under the Sherman Act," 7 LAw
AND CoNTEM. PROB. 104 at 108-109 (1940). See also the speech of Mr. Berge reported in
6 U.S. Law Week 282 (1938).
44 See Barnes, "Settlement by Consent Judgment," ABA Antitrust Section Proceedings
8 at 12 (April 1954). The first major case in which this procedure was followed was
United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1954) 1954 CCH Trade Cas. 1[67,920,
discussed in part II infra. However, it was reported that ten other cases in which this
procedure had been tried preceded the Eastman Kodak decree. N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22,
1954, p. 1:2.
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move and recommended "prefiling negotiations whenever the Division deems it feasible for efficient enforcement.''45 With this
recommendation, however, Professor Louis Schwartz took exception. Such a procedure, he asserted, will "whittle away the last
remnants of judicial control and public scrutiny in this area, and
involve the Government in bargaining with a law violator not only
as to the relief but also as to the nature of the accusation to be
made against him." 46 In addition, it has been suggested that prefiling negotiations automatically have the result of delaying the
actual filing of the complaint unduly. 47 But the strength and relevance of this latter argument are open to question, for, although
probably correct, it overlooks the countervailing points that (I)
the pre-filing procedure saves even more time and expense than
the normal post-complaint negotiation method and, (2) the negotiations may proceed on a much more flexible basis because the
prosecutor has not yet publicly committed himself. As to the point
that the procedure tends to lessen the degree of judicial control
and public scrutiny, it has already been pointed out that both of
these factors are already negligible elements in the consent decree
process.48 Lastly, even though there may be an element of "shaping the complaint to fit the settlement" here, there is no indication
that, as a practical matter, this is always bad. If it is all right to
enter into a consent decree that bears a questionable relationship
to the already-filed complaint,49 then surely it is permissible to
decide what relief will be agreed to and then draw a consistent
complaint. At least the suggestion of such a procedure ought not
to be subject to immediate and blanket condemnation.
Responsibility for Initiation of Negotiations. Another recommendation of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study
the .Antitrust Laws was that the government liberalize its heretofore strict practice of making the defendant submit the initial draft
of a consent judgment.50 This proposal has received a mixed re360.
Schwartz Dissent, 1 ANTITRUsr BuL. 37 at 53 (1955).
47 Stedman, "The Committee's Report: More Antitrust Enforcement-Or Less?" 50
N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 316 at 324 (1955).
48 See note 9 supra. See also Segal and Mullinix, "Administration and Enforcement,"
104 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 285 at 293-294 (1955).
49 In United States v. Hilton Hotels Co., (D.C. Ill. 1956) 1956 CCH Trade Cas. 1[68,253,
the complaint had alleged that the defendant corporation had violated §7 of the Clayton
Act by acquiring the Statler hotel chain. In the consent decree the defendant was ordered
to sell certain specified hotels, none of which, however, were of the Statler chain.
50 REPORT 361.
45 REPORT

46
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action.51 It seems likely that the government's position on this
matter is intimately connected with its thinking on the question
of concurrent civil and criminal actions. It has long been the
policy of the Antitrust Division to let the defendant take the first
step where criminal proceedings were pending, lest it seem as if it
were trying to coerce a consent settlement.52 But, as long as there
are no criminal proceedings involved, there would seem to be nothing questionable in the suggested procedure, other than the extraordinarily flimsy argument that because it may give the government less of an advantage in the negotiations, it is, to that extent,
bad.53

IL Recent Consent Decrees
Practical limitations preclude a review of all of the many consent decrees entered into by the government and antitrust defendants in the past several years. But some of the more recent
decrees have made newspaper headlines and more than one has
contained provisions of more than routine interest.
The Eastman Kodak Decree. The consent decree handed
down in United States v. Eastman Kodak Co.54 was one of the first
major consent judgments of the Eisenhower administration and
also one of the most publicized, because of its immediate effect on
photographers, amateur and professional.55 It is significant also
in that it represented one of the first settlements arrived at via the
pre-filing method described above.56 By the decree, Eastman
Kodak is directed to offer its Kodacolor and Kodachrome film for
sale without making a retail charge for the processing and developing of the film and also to cease distributing such film with the
restriction that it be processed and developed by Eastman. To
facilitate competition in the color film processing business, the defendant was also required to license its patents for color processing
and color processing equipment on a reasonable royalty basis, and
51 Compare Chadwell, "Antitrust Administration and Enforcement," 53 MICH. L.
REv. II33 at 1143-1144 (1955), with Stedman, :'The Committee's Report: More Antitrust
Enforcement-Or Less?" 50 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 316 at 325-326 (1955).
' 52 See note 40 supra.
53 This argument is made, with a fascinating display of logic, by Stedman, "The
Committee's Report: More Antitrust Enforcement-Or Less?" 50 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 316
at 325-/126 (1955).
54 (D.C. N.Y. 1954) 1954 CCH Trade Cas. ,167,920.
55 For a recent report of the effect of the Eastman Kodak decree, see WALL ST. J.,
April 24, 1956, pp. 1:6, 13:1.
56 See note 44 supra, and Bus. WEEK, Jan. 29, 1955, p. 66.
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also to make available technical information, manuals, designs,
specifications, etc., relating to color processing to any applicant.
As a part of this requirement, the decree provides that Eastman
must send instructors to help licensees in the use of color processing and receive visits by experts of such licensees.57 Lastly,
Eastman must offer for sale chemicals and other materials used in
color processing which are not readily available elsewhere. To
stimulate the free sale of color film without the processing and
developing charge, Eastman was also directed to cancel all fair
trade contracts relating to its color film price, presumably on the
basis that these fair trade contracts were based upon retail charges
which included the processing of the film by Eastman.58
The unique and most important aspect of this consent decree is
its use of a "conditional divestiture" provision. Under this provision, Eastman will be required to divest itself of so much of its
color film processing facilities as exceeds 50 percent of the domestic
capacity after seven years unless it can then show that there is substantial competition in the color processing market between it and
independent processors having a substantial volume of such business. This is, obviously, a clever self-policing mechanism by
which it is almost assured that a competitive situation will be
generated.
The International Business Machines Decree. Closely paralleling the Eastman Kodak decree is the settlement entered into between the Department of Justice and the International Business
Machines Corporation on January 25, 1956.59 The government's
complaint against IBM was filed on January 21, 1952, and alleged
that the defendant was monopolizing the domestic and foreign tabulating machine industry, "including new and used tabulating
machines, machine parts and service, cards, and service bureaus."60
IBM; it was alleged, controlled 90 percent of the tabulating machine business in the United States. Material to the development
of this dominant position, or so the government (and later Sperry57 This controversial "know-how" type of relief is commonly found in a decree today.
See Timberg, "Equitable Relief Under the Sherman Act," 1950 UNIV. ILL. L. FORUM 629
at 641-647. One of the first major decrees into which it was incorporated was United
States v. American Can Co., (D.C. Cal. 1950) 1950 CCH Trade Cas. 'j[62,679.
58 See N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1954, p. 1:2.
59 (D.C. N.Y. 1956) 1956 CCH Trade Cas. ,r68,245.
60 Complaint in United States v. International Business Machines Corp., Civil No.
C-72-344, filed Jan. 21, 1952, p. 15.
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Rand Corporation in a $90,000,000 treble damage suit) charged
were the following factors: 61
I. Control by IBM of important patents for both electrical
and electronic tabulating machines; refusal by IBM to grant licenses under these patents except to lessees of IBM machines; interference by IBM to prevent competitors from securing patents.
2. The practice of IBM of leasing rather than selling its machines and making tie-in arrangements to cover servicing, parts,
etc. As a practical matter, IBM also controlled all of the cards
used on its machine due to its control over the paper stock and
to various other practices and devices.
3. A closely-knit worldwide organization of subsidiaries which
supplied IBM with exclusive licenses on all patent rights acquired.
4. The prevention by IBM of the use of its machines on an
experimental basis by any lessee.
5. The practice of IBM of "buying up" inventors with longterm exclusive retainer contracts and of making contracts whereby
it was to be the exclusive recipient of any new discovery or development in the tabulating machine field.
6. The practice of IBM of granting discriminatory concessions to large customers in an effort to restrain any competition and
of arranging inter-locking directorates and interchanges of personnel with such lessees.
7. The operation by IBM of so-called service bureaus which
were able to draw in and control the demand for tabulating machine service by those who did not lease IBM machines.
The government, in its complaint, prayed that IBM be required to eliminate its patent monopoly by any appropriate means,
offer its tabulating machines for sale, divest itself of its service
bureaus and tabulating card business, cease imposing restrictions
in its leases or sales of tabulating machines, eliminate any and
61 The following allegations of illegal action by IBM is taken from the complaints of
the government and the Sperry-Rand Corporation. No representation is intended as to
the truth or falsity of these allegations, nor are the seven points listed intended, by any
means, to be exclusive.
It is central to an understanding of the situation in the tabulating machine industry
to realize that there are, at present, two separate and distinct systems-electrical and
mechanical. The electrical tabulating machine business comprises 90% of the overall
market and is controlled solely by IBM. The mechanical tabulating machine business
comprises the remaining 10% of the market and the sole manufacturer of these machines
today is Sperry-Rand Corporation. The mechanical machines, as a matter of technical
fact, use 90 column round hole cards and the electrical machines use 80 column rectangular hole cards. Hence, it is impossible to interchange the two systems. The foregoing
facts were admitted by IBM in its answer to the government's complaint.
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all territorial restrictions, and, lastly, give appropriate technical
instruction to any persons in the repair, maintenance, etc., of its
machines.
Comparing this prayer for relief with the actual terms of the
decree is sufficient to convince one that the negotiations were highly successful from the government's point of view. The following
are the key points of the IBM consent decree:
I. IBM must offer for sale its electrical tabulating machines
and electronic data processing machines (EDPM's) and not just
lease them, and must provide service, repair and parts at nondiscriminatory rates for machines that it sells. In other words, it
must see that a buyer of a tabulating machine is given treatment
substantially equal to that offered to lessees. IBM must also open
up a market in used tabulating machines by offering to sell such
machines received as trade-ins to dealers and also supply such
dealers with parts and service, etc. IBM cannot acquire its own
used machines other than as trade-ins or as credit against accounts
due IBM. The decree prohibits IBM from making leases of
longer than one year unless such a lease is terminable by the
lessee after one year, and also from imposing any restrictions or
tie-ins on its sale or lease of tabulating machines.
2. The decree requires IBM to divorce itself from its service
bureau business and establish that business as a separate corporation. Although IBM may own all the stock in the new corporation, there are strict terms controlling dominance by IBM and
also preventing discrimination against other service bureaus by
IBM or by the new corporation in favor of IBM.
3. IBM is required to license on a royalty free basis some forty
existing patents relating to tabulating cards and card machinery
and, at a reasonable royalty basis, some I 000 existing patents covering tabulating machines and systems and EDPM machines and
systems generally.62 These licenses, as usual, must be non-exclusive
and unrestricted, and must be accompanied by a non-exclusive
grant of immunity to suit under any corresponding foreign patent.
However, IBM need not grant a license to an applicant unless
(with some modification in the case of future patents and with the
exception of patents on the tabulating cards and tabulating card
machinery) the applicant either offers IBM a non-exclusive reasonable royalty license on or immunity to suit for infringement of
62 The figures are taken from N.Y.
owns some 1500 patents. Ibid.
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patents controlled by the applicant relating to tabulating or EDPM
systems. It may well be that this reciprocal licensing restriction on
the patent relief softens the blow of the decree on IBM, for it is
possible that many potentially competitive companies do not feel
like paying this high a price to get a license from IBM, royalty
free or not.
Future IBM patents are also subject to the compulsory licensing provision. They must also contain a non-exclusive grant of
immunity to suit under corresponding foreign patents, but can
all be licensed at reasonable royalty rates. Here, too, as a condition to the granting of a license, IBM can require the applicant
to agree to grant back to IBM a non-exclusive reasonable royalty
license as to patents o~ tabulating cards, machinery, systems, etc.,
and EDPM systems, owned or controlled by the applicant for the
IBM license.
4. IBM is required to furnish each patent licensee, for five
years, appropriate technical information, relating to the electrical
tabulating machines only, at reasonable and non-discriminatory
rates, including specifications, manu~ls, etc. In connection with
the required sale of IBM machines, it is also provided that IBM
furnish technical information and training to employees of repair
or maintenance businesses, at reasonable and non-discriminatory
rates. Written material and technical information must also be
furnished to purchasers or lessees of IBM machines. ·
5. IBM is specifically restrained, for a period of ten years,
from entering into any long term consultant contracts with outside experts or inventors. It may, however, have such people as
regular employees with regular hours or as consultants under oneyear contracts. 63
6. Tabulating cards and tabulating card machinery were
obviously central in the government's mind, as seen from the
royalty free provisions of the patent part of the decree. In addition to this, IBM is also required to eliminate any exclusive dealing arrangements as to the raw materials of the tabulating cards,
to cease discriminating in price as to such cards or prescribing unreasonable specifications for cards to be used in IBM tabulating
machines, etc. IBM must also offer for sale, for five years, rotary
presses and paper stock used in manufacturing tabulating cards if
the purchaser cannot acquire it elsewhere and if the purchaser is a
63 Query whether or not the means for evading this provision is apparent on the
surface: perpetually renewable one-year contracts.
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bona fide potential manufacturer of such cards and if, in the case
of the paper stock, IBM has more than it reasonably needs. Then
follows the same conditional divestiture provision found in the
Eastman Kodak decree. Unless, after seven years, IBM can show
that "substantial competitive conditions exist in the manufacture,
sale and distribution of tabulating cards," 64 it will be required to
divest itself of so much of its tabulating card business as exceeds
50 percent of the total capacity for the manufacture of such cards
in the United States.
The American Telephone and Telegraph Decree. The decree
entered into between the government and the American Telephone and Telegraph Company and the Western Electric Company65 came more than seven years after the initial filing of the
complaint in the action. The decree encompasses three main
areas, aside from various minor provisions.
1. The most important provision of this decree relates to
patents. Some 8600 patents owned by the defendants must be
licensed royalty free to any applicant. All other patents owned
by the Bell system are to be licensed at reasonable royalty rates.
In both cases, the licenses are to be non-exclusive and must include a grant of immunity to suit under corresponding foreign
licenses. The licenses may contain a condition that any grants of
licens~s by an applicant for an AT&T license to any of the defendants must cover patents of subsidiary or parent or co-subsidiaries of the same parent company of the applicant and patents
on inventions made by inventors or researchers of the applicant
or other such companies. The patents which are subject to the
royalty free provision are those that previously had been held by
the defendants jointly with General Electric Company, Radio
Corporation of America, and Westinghouse Electric Company
under agreements dating back to 1932. Included in the group is
the patent to the vital electronic transistor. The Department of
Justice stated that the patent provision was "unprecedented in
breadth and duration" 66 and there is every evidence that this was
the most important provision to the defendants as well.67
64 1956 CCH Trade Cas. ,r68,245 at p. 71,129.
65 (D.C. N.J. 1956) 1956 CCH Trade Cas. ,r68,246.
66 N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1956, p. 1:5 at 16:4, 5.
67 See Bus. WEEK, Feb. 4, 1956, pp. 26-28; 54 PUB. UTJL. 240 (1956). This is not to
say, however, that the royalty free provision hurt the defendant from a financial standpoint, as prior to the decree AT&:T had never imposed high royalties on licenses it granted,
and 1,000 patents had been made available without restriction previously. See N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 1956, p. 37:8.
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2. AT&T is required by the decree to supply patent licensees
with technical information relating to the materials and parts
comprising the licensed equipment, including drawings, specifications, etc. This right may not be subject to any restrictions save
that it may be conditioned upon the payment of reasonable charges
and on the furnishing of technical information relating to licenses
granted by the applicant to the defendants.
3. AT&T is required by the decree to get out_ of the private
communications field and confine itself, both in terms of present
activity and future acquisitions, to "common carrier communications" work, defined to mean communications work subject to
federal and/or state control. This means, in effect, that AT&T
must divest itself of its Westrex and Teletypesetter subsidiaries.
But the government was unable to get the consent of the defendants to the original demand that AT&T divest itself of its manufacturing subsidiary, Western Electric Company. And it may be
noted that, in any case, less than one percent of the Bell system
revenues came from the private communications area. 68
The American Association of Advertising Agencies and the
American Newspaper Publishers Association Decrees. On May
12, 1955, the government filed its complaint against the American
Association of Advertising Agencies, Inc., the American Newspaper Publishers Association, Inc., the Publishers Association of
New York City, the Associated Business Publications, Inc., the
Periodical Publishers Associations of America and the Agricultural
Publishers Association under section I of the Sherman Act, charging the defendants with conspiring and combining to restrain the
business of developing, placing and servicing national advertising.
On February I, 1956, the AAAA signed a consent judgment in this
action69 and on April 26, 1956, the ANPA, after having stated
when the AAAA decree was signed that it would not sign a consent decree,70 followed suit.71 A comparison of the principal provisions of the two decrees discloses the following:
I. Both defendants consented to refrain from making contracts establishing or fixing advertising agency commissions. Be68 Bus.

WEEK, Feb. 4, 1956, pp. 26-28.
(D.C. N.Y. 1956) 1956 CCH Trade Cas. 1f68,252.
70 See N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1956, p. 26:4.
71 (D.C. N.Y. 1956) 1956 CCH Trade Cas. ,r68,330. The Publishers Associations of New
York City stipulated that it will accept the terms of the ANPA consent decree. N.Y.
TIMES, April 27, 1956, p. 17:2.
69

1956]

COMMENTS

107

fore the decree, it was generally agreed that the "acceptable"
agency commission was 15 percent.72 The government had
charged that those agencies which had not gone along with this
were subjected to boycott. Further, both decrees contain provisions enjoining the defendants from taking any anti-rebating action. (As to this provision, the interesting view has been taken
that it will encourage "chiseling" in agency contracts.73 )
2. Central to both decrees is an injunction against the efforts
of the defendants to establish recognition of certain advertising
agencies and to encourage the media to do business only with the
agencies so recognized.
3. Both defendants are enjoined by the decrees from attempting to secure adherence to published rate cards and from attempting to fix and stabilize advertising rates to be charged so-called
house agency advertisers.
4. The AAAA is specifically restrained from enforcing its
no-speculative solicitation rule. Previously, the association had
banned speculative presentations by member agencies in the latter's efforts to seek new accounts.74
5. The ANPA is specifically allowed to establish credit ratings
for advertising agencies, so long as such ratings are uniformly
given when requested by responsible agencies.
6. Conspicuous by its absence in the ANPA decree is a provision (found in the AAAA decree, as in most, if not all, other
recent consent decrees) for the right of inspection of records, accounts, etc., of the defendant and the right to interview and request periodic reports from officers of the defendant. Presumably
this omission is justified by an extreme application of the principle
of freedom of the press.

III. Royalty Free Licensing: A Case Study in the Scope of
Consent Decree Relief
Some interesting forms of relief appeared in the consent decrees considered above-compulsory licensing of patents, sometimes even royalty free, "know-how" relief, conditional divestiture,
right of visitation and duty to report, etc. What is the relation of '
these provisions to the antitrust laws themselves? Are they authorized by the Sherman Act and, if so, are they constitutional?
254 PRINTER'S INK, Feb. 10, 1956, pp. 26-27.
78Ibid.
74 Ibid.
72 See
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Even if both of these questions are answered, one yet remains.
To the extent that particular relief has been denied by the courts
in litigated cases, should it be included in consent decrees?
It would be impossible to consider all of the different consent
decree relief provisions in respect to these questions, and so it is
proposed to consider only the most controversial one-compulsory
licensing of patents royalty free. 75 In considering it, we shall,
ultimately, find ourselves back to the basic question of the nature
of a consent decree.
·
As was seen above, both the IBM and AT&T decrees contained provisions requiring the defendants to license some of their
patents royalty free. These are but two of scores of consent decrees having such a provision.76 But compare with this situation
that in the area of litigated consent decrees. In Hartford Empire
Co. v. United States77 the district court had entered a decree which
required the defendant to grant to any applicant a license under
defendant's patents, without royalty or charge of any kind. In
remanding the case to the district court for a new decree, the
Supreme Court ruled that this provision was confiscatory in nature and not justified by the circumstances of the case. Reaffirm·ing the principle that "a patent is property," 78 the Court also observed that Congress had not seen fit to adopt proposals to provide
that forfeiture of patents would be decreed for violations of the
antitrust laws. Thus, the use of the "patent is property" concept
is the only constitutional basis suggested for the denial of this relief. Most of the other objections seem to be based on policy or
75 For a discussion of other relief provisions which may "go beyond existing law," see
Peterson, "Consent Decrees: A Weapon of Antitrust Enforcement," 18 UNIV. KAN. CrrY L.
REv. 34 (1950).
76 For citation to other consent decrees containing such a provision, see Seegert,
"Compulsory Licensing by Judicial Action: A Remedy for Misuse of Patents," 47 MICH.
L. REv. 613 at 636, n. 159 (1949); Timberg, "Equitable Relief Under the Sherman Act,"
1950 UNIV. !LL. L. FORUM 629 at 640-641, n. 52; 24 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 223 at 228, n. 40, 41
(1955). The scores of decrees listed by these authorities contain either a royalty free
licensing provision or a requirement that the patent be dedicated. For some purposes it
might well be proper to draw a distinction between these two types of relief as there are,
at least, technical differences. For instance, in the case of a royalty free provision, the
title to the patent is still retained by the patentee and there must be some formal, written
application by a prospective licensee. In addition, such a provision might always be
amenable to modification. In the case of patent dedication, however, there is nothing left
in the patentee whatsoever. See 22 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 257 (1953); 24 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 223 (1955). However, for purposes of the present discussion there is probably no
really relevant distinction, and the two types of provisions are considered together here.
See note 27 supra.
77 323 U.S. 386, 65 S.CL 373 (1945).
78 Id. at 415.
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expediency. Justices Black and Rutledge, dissenting, both said
that the royalty free provision was proper and was the only form
of relief that would be effective under the circumstances.
In United States v. National Lead Co.79 the district court had
refused to place a provision in the litigated decree granting royalty
free licensing. The government argued to the Supreme Court
that such a provision was proper and should be inserted instead of
the reasonable royalty provision which was included in the decree.
The Court, in affirming the district court, succinctly stated its position as follows: " ... we feel that, without reaching the question
whether royalty-free licensing or a perpetual injunction against
the enforcement of a patent is permissible as a matter of law in
any case, the present decree represents an exercise of sound judicial discretion."80 The Court also stressed, more than once, that
the aim of a decree was to remedy and prevent wrongs, not punish
them, and that the royalty free provision has not "been shown to
be necessary in order to enforce effectively the Antitrust Act. We
do not, in this case, face the issue of the constitutionality of such
an order."81 Three justices dissented on this issue, pointing out
that Hartford Empire was a four-to-two decision on this point and
asserting that it was not authority for saying that royalty free
licensing is an unacceptable provision. Accordingly, these justices
argued that the facts of National Lead warranted the inclusion of
such a provision.
The district courts have, since these cases, split on the issue of
the validity of provisions for the royalty free licensing of patents
in litigated antitrust decrees. In United States v. Vehicular
Parking,82 decided after Hartford Empire but before National
Lead, the court cited the former case for the conclusion that it did
not have the power or authority to include such a provision. And
in United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries8 3 the court cited
the "patent is property" language of Hartford Empire as a basis
for refusing this relief. But in United States v. General Electric
Co.,8 4 Judge Foreman said that the Hartford Empire holding was
79 332

U.S. 319, 67 S.Ct. 1634 (1947).
at 338.
at 349.
82 (D.C. Del. 1945) 61 F. Supp. 656 (decree).
·88 (D.C. N.Y. 1952) 105 F. Supp. 215 at 223-225.
84 (D.C. N.J. 1953) 115 F. Supp. 835 at 843-846. See also United States v. General
Instrument Corp., (D.C. N.J. 1953) 115 F. Supp. 582. For notes on the former case, see 54
CoL. L. REV. 278 (1954); 63 YALE L.J. 717 (1954); 22 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 257 (1953).
80 Id.
81 Id.
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seriously diluted by National Lead, and he distinguished the ICI
case on the rather flimsy ground that only section 1 of the Sherman
Act had been involved there while in the GE case both sections 1
and 2 were involved. As a result, he felt free to decree dedication
of certain patents owned by General Electric.85
The debate on the wisdom and desirability of royalty free
licensing has continued.86 One thing is clear-whether or not it
is an acceptable antitrust remedy, the state of the authority in the
area of litigated decrees leads to no other conclusion than that it is
not yet, at least, an accepted one. Is it, therefore, proper to insert
such a debatable and debated provision into an antitrust consent
decree? In its section on consent decrees the Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws
had this to say:
"In consent negotiation, the Department should not seek
relief (1) deemed by the Supreme Court to transgress constitutional boundaries; or (2) which, in the particular case,
could not reasonably be expected after litigation. It has been
urged that, since the Division, no mere private litigant, enforces a federal statute, it should demand whatever relief, in
the public interest, its bargaining position may coerce. We
believe that view ignores the prosecutor's responsibility to
stay within statutory and constitutional bounds. It threatens
our goal of equitable law enforcement and, accordingly,
should be rejected." 87
It seems clear that the reference here was to the royalty free
licensing problem.88 Professor Louis Schwartz did not concur in
this position, however. Dissenting, he argued that acceptance of
such a principle would "cut the heart out of a number of consent
decrees that powerful and excellently advised defendants have been
willing to sign in recent years."89 Further, he pointed out that
85 It has been pointed out that Judge Foreman's pragmatic approach to the problem
was admirably suited to the facts in the GE case. The court had to pry open a forty-year
old monopoly in an industry in which the profit margin per unit manufactured (light
bulbs) was so small that even a nominal royalty would have had the effect of discouraging
competition. See Diggins, "The Patent-Antitrust Problem," 53 MICH. L. REv. 1093 at
lll6 (1955); 63 YALE L.J. 717 (1954).
86 See, e.g:: Seegert, "Compulsory Licensing by Judicial Action: A Remedy for Misuse
of Patents," 47 MICH. L. REv. 613 (1949); 24 Gro. WASH. L. REv. 223 (1955). The members
of the attorney general's committee were sharply divided on this question. REPORT 255-259.
87 REPORT 361.
ss Schwartz Dissent, I ANrrmusr BUL. 37 at 53 (1955).
. 89 Id. at 53. See also Stedman, "The Committee's Report: More Antitrust Enforcement
-Or Less?" 50 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 316 at 324-325 (1955). But see Segal and Mullinix,
"Administration and Enforcement," 104 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 285 at 296 (1955).
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the problem centered on borderline cases-where the constitutional and statutory basis for the relief was in doubt. The Antitrust Division should be allowed to press for inclusion of such a
provision, he argued, for otherwise it is confined to relief of unquestioned validity and this "can probably be gotten in litigation."90
In 1954 former Assistant Attorney General Barnes expressed
himself as basically in accord with the position subsequently taken
by the Report.91 He said that (I) there was never any question
about the impropriety of asking for clearly unconstitutional relief, (2) during his term of office no relief not previously granted
in litigation has been included in any consent decree, and (3) as to
the question of asking for relief "which no court would grant in a
particular case, then I suggest it merely pits defendant's judgment
of what is required to promote competition against the Division's.
And if the defendant is really that confident, I would suggest the
only remedy is to proceed to trial." 92 Despite the fact that this
statement still leaves several questions unanswered, it must be admitted that the basic thinking behind it is a bit more comforting
than the statement by a 1940 antitrust official that a valuable
aspect of consent decrees is that they "may contain various socially
desirable provisions for reforming the conduct of an industry even
though the Government could not force the defendants to accept
such provisions. " 93
Bearing in mind that the royalty free licensing provision is
only one situation in which the government has been subject to
the charge of "going beyond existing law," it would be well to
conclude by asking just what ought to be the proper position of
the government in these areas. Where should the line be drawn
90 Schwartz Dissent, 1 ANnn!.uST BUL. 37 at 54 (1955). Query whether there is an
element of question-begging here. One of the prime premises of consent decree procedure
is that, usually, neither party is sure of the outcome of the case if it were to go to trial.
There is always the chance that the government would get no relief at all. By entering
into a consent settlement, the government compromises on this possibility and is given
some relief. Professor Schwartz' argument seems to assume that the government starts the
negotiations in the position of always being able to get some relief in litigation so that the
compromise should be, he would argue, on the nature of the relief, giving the government something more than their assured minimum, even including relief of a nature that
they might not be able to get in a litigated decree.
91 Barnes, "Settlement by Consent Judgment," ABA Antitrust Section Proceedings
8 at 12 (April 1954).
92 Ibid.
93 Berge, "Remedies Available to the Government Under the Sherman Act," 7 LA.w
AND CoNTEM. PROB. 104 at 107 (1940). See also the speech of Mr. Berge reported in 6 U.S.
Law Week 282 (1938).
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between permissible and non-permissible provisions? Everyone
seems to agree that "clearly unconstitutional" provisions should
not be included. Though an argument might once have been
supportable that royalty free licensing deprived a patentee of his
property without due process of law, in violation of the Fifth
Amendment,94 the decision in the National Lead case would seem
to indicate that not even the majority of the court, in refusing to
require such a provision, were willing to rest their position on anything remotely resembling a constitutional basis. And even if
valid constitutional objections could be urged as to the provision
in the context of a litigated decree, it may be held that the defendant waives these objections when he consents to such a provision.95
The second possible ground for objection is that such provisions are not authorized by the statute and the prosecution is going beyond the statutory bounds in including them in a decree.96
But who determines the statutory bounds? If this determination
must rest on Supreme· Court decisions, the situation is obviously
unsatisfactory, for such decisions are too few and, as in the Hartford Empire and National Lead cases, often leave the matter just
as clouded as before. Should what equals "the statutory bounds"
rest upon litigated decisions, i.e., if you can find such-and-such a
provision in a litigated decree, it is acceptable in a consent decree?
This appears to be the position subscribed to by Judge Barnes in
the statement quoted above. For example, he apparently is willing to say that as long as the GE case is on the books, consent decrees may, under any circumstances, contain a provision for the
royalty free licensing of patents. It is submitted that the presence
of one litigated decree is not an adequate or responsible measure
of what is permissible in all cases in a consent decree. Particularly
is this so when, as in the GE case, the particular litigated decree
contained the relevant provision only because it was considered
essential to effective antitrust enforcement under the unique facts
of the case. 97 A much more desirable standard is whether the
94 For such an argument, see 19 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 400 (1951).
95 Id. at 418. There would seem to be a nice question as to whether the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment can be waived by a party. Cf. Rogers v. United States,
340 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 438 (1951); 61 YALE L.J. 105 (1952) (privilege against self-incrimination); Adams v. United States ex_rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 63 S.Ct. 236 (1942) (federal
right to counsel).
96 See Oppenheim, "Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National
Antitrust Policy," 50 MICH. L. REv. 1139 at 1228-1236 (1952); Peterson, "Consent Decrees:
A Weapon of Antitrust Enforcement," 18 UNIV. KAN. CITY L. REv. 34 (1950).
97 See note 85 supra.
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relief included could or "could not reasonably be expected after
litigation." 98 The answer that if the defendant maintains that it
could not "reasonably be expected" he ought to go ahead to trial
and find out99 is too weak to deserve extended analysis. The government should not be in the position of pushing questionable
provisions on a defendant in negotiations designed to avoid the
time and expense of litigation and then justify these same provisions by saying that if the defendant wanted to challenge their
legality, he should have gone to trial. What may "reasonably be
expected in litigation" is_, of course, entirely dependent upon the
particular circumstances of each case. Such a test would not preclude royalty free licensing in any and all cases-the GE case indicates that, under some circumstances, this provision may be
necessary to effective enforcement. But neither would this test
allow such a wholesale inclusion, irrespective of the facts, as the
government has sought and achieved in recent years.
The line between proper and improper provisions in consent
decrees is difficult to draw from a purely procedural point of view.
It is more important to secure agreement on a basic philosophy in
this matter than it is to draw firm and fine lines to apply to all
cases. In this respect it is necessary to revert to the contract-decree
dichotomy mentioned earlier and quote the observations of.a leading writer in this area to the effect that it is a
"fundamental concept that the antitrust consent decree is not
to be viewed solely as a contract resulting from an unrestricted
bargaining process between the government and the defendants. Rather, it is an agreement for voluntary settlement of
antitrust issues in which the scope and content of the provisions therein can rise no higher than their source in the legislative objectives and prohibitions of the standards embodied
by Congress in its national antitrust policy. . . . It follows,
therefore, that neither antitrust officials nor a court of equity
has authority under law to induce or to accept provisions in
consent decrees unless they are related to the prevention and
correction of violations of the antitrust laws .... " 100
Therefore, above and beyond any test of what could "reasonably be expected in litigation," the provisions of antitrust consent
361.
note 92 supra and adjacent text.
100 Oppenheim, "Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National
Antitrust Policy," 50 M1cH. L. REv. 1139 at 1230, 1234 (1952). See also Peterson, "Consent
Decrees: A Weapon of Antitrust Enforcement," 18 UNIV. KAN. Crrv L. REv. 34 at 50 (1950).
98 REPORT
90 See
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decrees should be conformable to and justifiable by the necessity
of prevention and correction of antitrust violations. They should
not be rationalized either on a penal basis or on a basis that they
are valid per se if accepted by the defendant in the negotiations.
In the last analysis, the responsibility lies with the Department
of Justice. It must recognize that the consent decree is a "full
blooded judicial sentence"101 issued by a court for the purpose of
law enforcement. Recognizing this, it must be the party to see
that the provisions of these decrees conform to the standard
enunciated above. It has already been shown that the judiciary
has abdicated this responsibility,102 and it is to be hoped that the
Department of Justice will now fill the gap thus created.

Paul R. Haerle, S.Ed.

101 Peterson,

"Consent Decrees: A Weapon of Antitrust Enforcement," 18

CITY L. REv. 34 at 50 (1950).
102 See

note 10 supra.
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